how to not get hacked my ether wallet free

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Popular crypto service MyEtherWallet hit by attack after Hola VPN gets hacked
 
how to not get hacked my ether wallet free

A hacker stole $31M of Ether — how it happened, and what it means for EthereumPopular crypto service MyEtherWallet hit by attack after Hola VPN gets hacked – TechCrunchmyetherwallet hackedFree ethereum hack
 
Not only did the hacker take my ETH, but they also sold my PAR tokens for ETH. Double whammy. At the time of the theft, both were worth $1, May 27, · “A hacker got my mnemonic and stole , in ethereum from my Metamask wallet in under seconds. Get Free Ethereum.

 
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myetherwallet hacked 2021The internet’s core infrastructure was hacked to steal ethereum from a popular wallet serviceA hacker stole $31M of Ether — how it happened, and what it means for EthereumFree ethereum hack
Having sounded the alarm bells, a group of benevolent white-hat hackers from the Ethereum community rapidly organized. They analyzed the attack and realized that there was no way to reverse the thefts, yet many more wallets were vulnerable. Time was of the essence, so they saw only one available option: hack the remaining wallets before the attacker did. To prevent the hacker from robbing any more banks, the white-hats wrote software to rob all of the remaining banks in the world. Once the money was safely stolen, they began the process of returning the funds to their respective account holders. The people who had their money saved by this heroic feat are now in the process of retrieving their funds. Rather, it was a vulnerability in the default smart contract code that the Parity client gives the user for deploying multi-signature wallets. This is all pretty complicated, so to make the details of this clear for everyone, this post is broken into three parts:. There are three building blocks to this story: Ethereum , smart contracts , and digital wallets. Ethereum is a digital currency invented in — a full 4 years after the release of Bitcoin. While Bitcoin uses its blockchain to implement a ledger of monetary transactions, Ethereum uses its blockchain to record state transitions in a gigantic distributed computer. To put it another way, Ethereum is literally a computer that spans the entire world. Anyone who runs the Ethereum software on their computer is participating in the operations of this world-computer, the Ethereum Virtual Machine EVM. Because the EVM was designed to be Turing-complete ignoring gas limits , it can do almost anything that can be expressed in a computer program. Let me be emphatic: this is crazy stuff. The crypto world is ebullient about the potential of Ethereum, which has seen its value skyrocket in the last 6 months. Smart contracts are simply computer programs that run on the EVM. Instead, they are compiled to bytecode and interpreted unambiguously by the EVM. With these programs, you can among other things programmatically transfer digital currency based solely on the rules of the contract code. This leads us to the notion of wallets. In the world of digital currencies, wallets are how you store your assets. You gain access to your wallet using essentially a secret password, also known as your private key simplified a bit. There are many different types of wallets that confer different security properties, such as withdrawal limits. One of the most popular types is the multi-signature wallet. In a multi-signature wallet, there are several private keys that can unlock the wallet, but just one key is not enough to unlock it. If your multi-signature wallet has 3 keys, for example, you can specify that at least 2 of the 3 keys must be provided to successfully unlock it. This means that if you, your father, and your mother are each signatories on this wallet, even if a criminal hacked your mother and stole her private key, they could still not access your funds. This leads to much stronger security guarantees, so multi-sigs are a standard in wallet security. So what went wrong? Did they break the private keys? Did they use a quantum computer, or some kind of cutting-edge factoring algorithm? Nope, all the cryptography was sound. The exploit was almost laughably simple: they found a programmer-introduced bug in the code that let them re-initialize the wallet, almost like restoring it to factory settings. Once they did that, they were free to set themselves as the new owners, and then walk out with everything. What follows is a technical explanation of exactly what happened. Ethereum has a fairly unique programming model. On Ethereum, you write code by publishing contracts which you can think of as objects , and transactions are executed by calling methods on these objects to mutate their state. In order to run code on Ethereum, you need to first deploy the contract the deployment is itself a transaction , which costs a small amount of Ether. You then need to call methods on the contract to interact with it, which costs more Ether. As you can imagine, this incentivizes a programmer to optimize their code, both to minimize transactions and minimize computation costs. One way to reduce costs is to use libraries. In Ethereum, keeping your code DRY will directly save you money. The default multi-sig wallet in Parity did exactly this. It held a reference to a shared external library which contained wallet initialization logic. This shared library is referenced by the public key of the library contract. It's essentially like a super call, except without the inheritance part. The equivalent in JavaScript would be OtherClass. This is all innocent enough. You define it by not giving it a name:. The Parity team decided to let any unknown method that sent Ether to the contract just default to depositing the sent Ether. But they took it a step further, and herein was their critical mistake. Below is the actual code that was attacked. Using this, the attacker called a method called initWallet , which was not defined on the multisig contract but was defined in the shared wallet library:. Do you see what just happened there? The attacker essentially reinitialized the contract by delegating through the library method, overwriting the owners on the original contract. They and whatever array of owners they supply as arguments will be the new owners. Given that they now control the entire wallet, they can trivially extract the remainder of the balance. So what was ultimately the vulnerability? You could argue there were two. First, the initWallet and initMultiowned in the wallet library were not marked as internal this is like a private method, which would prevent this delegated call , and those methods did not check that the wallet wasn't already initialized. Either check would've made this hack impossible. The second vulnerability was the raw delegateCall. You can think of this as equivalent to a raw eval statement, running on a user-supplied string. In an attempt to be succinct, this contract used metaprogramming to proxy potential method calls to an underlying library. The safer approach here would be to whitelist specific methods that the user is allowed to call. The trouble, of course, is that this is more expensive in gas costs since it has to evaluate more conditionals. But when it comes to security, we probably have to get over this concern when writing smart contracts that move massive amounts of money. It was a clever catch, but once you point it out, it seems almost elementary. The attacker then jumped on this vulnerability for three of the largest wallets they could find — but judging from the transaction times, they were doing this entirely manually. The DAO hack was unique in that when the attacker drained the DAO into a child DAO, the funds were frozen for many days inside a smart contract before they could be released to the attacker. This prevented any of the stolen funds from going into circulation, so the stolen Ether was effectively siloed. This gave the Ethereum community plenty of time to conduct a public quorum about how to deal with the attack. In this attack, the attacker immediately stole the funds and could start spending them. A hard fork would be impractical—what do you do about all of the transactions that occur downstream? What about the people who innocently traded assets with the attacker? First, remember, this was not a flaw in Ethereum or in smart contracts in general. Rather, it was a developer error in a particular contract. The developers here were a cross-collaboration between the Ethereum foundation literally the creators of Ethereum , the Parity core team, and members of the open-source community. It underwent extensive peer review. This is basically the highest standard of programming that exists in the Ethereum ecosystem. These developers were human. They made a mistake. And so did the reviewers who audited this code. How was it even possible they missed this? When I see responses like this, I know the people commenting are not professional developers. For a serious developer, the reaction is instead: damn, that was a dumb mistake. Mistakes of this sort are routinely made in programming. All programs carry the risk of developer error. As programs scale to non-trivial complexity, you have to start taking it as a given that programs are probably not correct. No amount of human diligence or testing is sufficient to prevent all possible bugs. Even organizations like Google or NASA make programming mistakes, despite the extreme rigor they apply to their most critical code. We would do well to take a page from site reliability practices at companies like Google and Airbnb. In these postmortems, there is always a principle of never blaming individuals. Blaming mistakes on individuals is pointless, because all programmers, no matter how experienced, have a nonzero likelihood of making a mistake. Instead, the purpose of a postmortem is to identify what in the process allowed that mistake to get deployed. The problem was not that the developer forgot to add internal to the wallet library, or that they did a raw delegateCall without checking what method was being called. The problem is that their programming toolchain allowed them to make these mistakes. As the smart contract ecosystem evolves, it has to evolve in the direction of making these mistakes harder, and that means making contracts secure by default. Strength is a weakness when it comes to programming languages. The stronger and more expressive a programming language is, the more complex its code becomes. Solidity is a very complex language, modeled to resemble Java. Complexity is the enemy of security. Complex programs are more difficult to reason about and harder to identify edge cases for. I think that languages like Viper maintained by Vitalik Buterin are a promising step in this direction. The less the language lets you do, the easier it is to analyze and prove properties of a contract. The fewer possible attack vectors you have to consider, the easier it is to develop a secure contract. A simpler programming model also allows things like formal verification and aic test generation. These are areas under active research, but just as smart contracts have incorporated cutting-edge cryptography, they also should start incorporating the leading edge of programming language design. Most of the programmers who are getting into this space, myself included, come from a web development background, and the blockchain toolchain is designed to be familiar for web developers. Solidity has achieved tremendous adoption in the developer community because of its familiarity to other forms of programming. In a way, this may end up being its downfall. The problem is, blockchain programming is fundamentally different from web development. Before the age of the client-server web model, most programming was done for packaged consumer software or on embedded systems. This was before the day of aic software updates. In these programs, a shipped product was final — you released one form of your software every 6 months, and if there was a bug, that bug would have to stand until the next release. Because of this longer development cycle, all software releases were rigorously tested under all conceivable circumstances. Web development is far more forgiving. These two development models are fundamentally different. Most programmers today are trained on the web development model. Unfortunately, the blockchain security model is more akin to the older model. In blockchain, code is intrinsically unrevertible. Being on Ethereum by definition means everyone owns your server. And once your attack is successful, you can potentially steal all of the money in the contract. Imagine that you were deploying software for vending machines. But instead of a bug allowing you to simply steal candy from one machine, the bug allowed you to simultaneously steal candy from every machine in the world that employed this software. In the case of a successful attack, defense is extremely difficult. The white-hats in the Parity hack demonstrated how limited their defense options were — there was no way to secure or dismantle the contracts, or even to hack back the stolen money; all they could do was hack the remaining vulnerable contracts before the attacker did. Rather, it confirms what everyone already knows: this ecosystem is young and immature. This means not just programmers maturing and getting more training. It also means developing tools and languages that make all of this easier, and give us rigorous guarantees about our code. You should not treat Ethereum as a bank or as a replacement for financial infrastructure. But despite all that, I still think Ethereum is going to win in the long run. Ethereum will not live or die because of the money in it. It will live or die based on the developers who are fighting for it. They did it because they believe in this ecosystem. They want Ethereum to thrive. They want to see their vision of the future come true. They are fundamentally why Ethereum will win in the long run—or if they abandon Ethereum, their abandonment will be why it loses. This attack is important. It will shake people up. It will force the community to take a long, hard look at security best practices. It will force developers to treat smart contract programming with far more rigor than they currently do. In the end, attacks like this are good for the community to grow up. They call you to your senses and force you to keep your eyes open. It hurts, and the press will likely make a mess of the story. But every wound makes the community stronger, and gets us closer to really deeply understanding the technology of blockchain — both its dangers, and its amazing potential. Errata: This article originally said that Gavin Wood was the developer of the contract, which is incorrect. Gavin is the founder of Parity and pushed the fix to the contract, but was not the original developer. If this article was helpful, tweet it. Learn to code for free. Get started. Forum Donate. But someone stopped them. Yes, you read that right. This is all pretty complicated, so to make the details of this clear for everyone, this post is broken into three parts: What exactly happened? An explanation of Ethereum, smart contracts, and multi-signature wallets. How did they do it? A technical explanation of the attack specifically for programmers. What now? If you are familiar with Ethereum and the crypto world, you can skip to the second section. What exactly happened? This is the type of wallet the hacker attacked. How did this happen? But they made one critical mistake. Deposit msg. So that was the attack. So what should we take away from this? What does this attack mean for Ethereum? There are several important takeaways here. So who were the crackpot developers who wrote this? This leads me to my next point. There is a bigger lesson here too. Let me explain. This might seem to spell a dark future.